Constitutional Law - Congressional Districting -  One Man-One Vote  Demands Near Mathematical Precision - Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) by Schar, Stephen L.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 19 
Issue 1 Fall 1969 Article 8 
Constitutional Law - Congressional Districting - "One Man-One 
Vote" Demands Near Mathematical Precision - Kirkpatrick v. 
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) 
Stephen L. Schar 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen L. Schar, Constitutional Law - Congressional Districting - "One Man-One Vote" Demands Near 
Mathematical Precision - Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), 19 DePaul L. Rev. 152 (1969) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol19/iss1/8 
This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING
-"ONE MAN-ONE VOTE" DEMANDS NEAR
MATHEMATICAL PRECISION
On January 4, 1965, a three-judge federal district court determined that
the 1961 Missouri Congressional Districting Act was unconstitutional, but
deferred granting judicial relief until the Missouri Legislature had "an
opportunity to deal with the problem."' Thereafter, the Missouri General
Assembly passed the 1965 Congressional Redistricting Act. When sub-
jected to judicial scrutiny, this Act was also found to be constitutionally
void.2 In 1967, the General Assembly enacted yet another redistricting
act.8 Based on 1960 United States census figures, the ten congressional
districts created by the 1967 Act ranged from 13,542 people (3.13 per
cent) above the mean population to 12,260 people (2.83 per cent) be-
low the mean. 4  The district court, one judge dissenting, ruled that the
1. Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 238 F. Supp. 187, 191 (W.D. Mo.
1965) [hereinafter cited as Preisler I]. The 1961 Act was declared unconsti-
tutional on the basis of Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964): Article I, § 2 of
the Constitution requires "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congres-
sional election is to be worth as much as another's." Id. at 7-8. See also text at
n.10-11.
2. Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 257 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Mo. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as Preisler 1I], a!fd per curiam sub. nom., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
385 U.S. 450 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Kirkpatrick I].
3. 1967 Congressional Redistricting Act, Mo. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 128.202-.305
(Supp. 1968).
4. Implementing the "one man-one vote" standard has given birth to the use of
two mathematical tests to measure deviations. The first is the population-variance
ratio, i.e., the ratio between the most populous district and the least populous dis-
trict. A perfectly districted state would have a population-variance ratio of one-to-
one. The second test measures deviations from the representational norm. Total
population is divided by the total number of legislators to derive the "ideal" district.
Given this figure, it is then possible to compute for each district the percentage
deviation from the ideal district population. Consequently, plus and minus maximum
percentage deviations can be reported and also the average percentage deviation can
be computed. See generally DIxoN, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPOR-
TIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 452-55 (1968); Auerbach, The Reapportionment
Cases: Otte Person, One Vote--One Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13;
Clem, Problems of Measuring and Achieving Equality of Representation in State
Legislatures, 42 NEB. L. REV. 622 (1963); Note, 79 HARV. L. REV, 1226, 1250-
1251 (1966); Note, 4 HOUST. L. REV. 577, 578-79 (1966).
1967 Act was also unconstitutional because it did not comply with the "as
nearly as practicable" standard of article 1, § 2 of the Constitution., On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the "as
nearly as practicable" rule requires that the state not only "make a good-
faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality," but also that any
remaining population disparities, "no matter how small," be justified.
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969) (hereinafter cited as
Kirkpatrick II).
This decision is significant because it represents the Supreme Court's
most recent effort to formulate guidelines defining the "as nearly as
practicable" standard. The purpose of this casenote is to analyze Kirk-
patrick II in light of relevant case law, to critically evaluate the guidelines
it establishes, and to demonstrate how it represents an extension of the
trend toward rigid interpretation of the "one man-one vote" doctrine.
The necessary starting point for a discussion of congressional districting
issues is the "one man-one vote" concept. This principle is based upon
the premise that the right of suffrage is so fundamental in a democratic
society that dilution of that franchise is as improper as denying it alto-
gether., To prevent a state from overweighting, or diluting, the votes of
some of its citizens, the Supreme Court has ruled that once a state has
determined the boundaries of its voting districts, " all who participate in
the election are to have an equal vote."7  In other words, when qualified
citizens exercise their right of franchise, each vote must be given as much
weight as any other vote. As a corollary, equality of voting strength is to
be achieved by requiring the states to draw election districts that contain
identical numbers of people. Thus, "one man-one vote" requires that
states implement the equal-population district principle.
Less than two years after its momentous decision in Baker v. Carr,"
the Supreme Court applied the "one man-one vote" principle to congres-
5. Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 279 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Mo. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as Preisler III]. See Wesberry, supra note 1.
6. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 567-68 (1964); Wesberry v.
Sanders, supra note 1, at 7; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963); and Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 242 (1962).
7. Gray v. Sanders, supra note 6, at 379. See generally, DIXON, supra note 4, at
172-77; and MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REP-
RESENTATION 83-9 (1965).
8. Baker v. Carr, supra note 6. Prior to Baker, it was widely believed that
federal courts would not review individual voter complaints about congressional
malapportionment. This negative view stemmed from the Supreme Court's four-to-
three dismissal in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), of a suit challenging
the constitutionality of the Illinois Congressional Redistricting Act. The Court's
majority opinion was internally ambiguous in suggesting both a total lack of juris-
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sional districting disputes. In Wesberry v. Sanders,q- the Court invali-
dated the congressional districting plan enacted by the Georgia Legislature
because it grossly discriminated against the voters in the largest districts.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, concluded that the com-
mand of article 1, § 2 of the Constitution, that "Representatives . . .be
• . .chosen by the People of the Several States . . .," construed in its
historical context, means "that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in
diction (exclusive constitutional commitment of congressional districting to Con-
gress) and a theory of nonjusticiability (judicial self-restraint in entering the "politi-
cal thicket"). Whatever the meaning of Colegrove, the case stood as an insur-
mountable hurdle to reapportionment suits for over fourteen years.
The first harbinger of change was Gomillion v. Lihtfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960),
wherein the Supreme Court unanimously declared unconstitutional an Alabama state
law redefining the city boundaries of Tuskegee so as to place all but four or five of
the city's Negro voters outside the city limits, without removing a single white
voter. While the Gomillion decision rested solely on the fifteenth amendment's
mandate that neither state nor federal governments may restrict voting rights on the
grounds of race, the Court's willingness to act in the Tuskegee case did suggest
that it might reconsider the Colegrove principle, and in fact it did so in Baker v.
Carr, supra note 6.
In Baker, the plaintiffs attacked Tennessee's legislative apportionment on the
grounds that inequality in voting districts caused by the failure of the Tennessee leg-
islature to reapportion resulted in a denial to plaintiffs of rights guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, found that
claims of population inequality among election districts are within the jurisdiction
of the federal courts; that the issues are justiciable; and that individual voters have
standing to raise the issues. While Baker involved a state legislative reapportion-
ment case, it was clear that the Court's majority opinion left "standing no gener-
ally applicable objection to . . .federal judicial intervention in congressional district-
ing cases." Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv.
252, 326; accord, Mitchell, Judicial Self-Restraint: Political Questions and Malappor-
tionment, 39 WASH. L. REV. 761, 774 (1964); Murphy, Congressional Redistricting,
October Term, 1963, 16 MAINE L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1964).
9. Wesberry v. Sanders, supra note I. In Wesberry, the Supreme Court made
more explicit the point on which after Baker there should have been no doubt.
Neither Colegrove nor any other decision could be read to deny federal courts
jurisdiction or justiciability of cases challenging state-imposed imbalance in congres-
sional election districts. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, stated:
"[Wile made it clear in Baker that nothing in the language of [article 1, § 4 of the
Constitution] gives support to a construction that would immunize state congressional
apportionment laws which debase a citizen's right to vote from the power of courts
to protect the constitutional rights of individuals from legislative destruction ...
iThe lower court's dismissal] can no more be justified on the ground of 'want of
equity' than on the ground of 'nonjusticiability.'" Wesberry v. Sanders, supra note 1,
at 6-7. Thus, in Wesberry the Supreme Court clearly overruled Colegrove v. Green
and held that congressional districting disputes are susceptible of judicial determina-
tion. See generally DIXON, supra note 4, at 182-95; HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL
DisTRiCTING: THE ISSUE OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 122-29 (rev. ed. 1964);
MCKAY, supra note 7, at 89-98; Carpenter, Wesberry v. Sanders: A Case of Over-
simplification, 9 VILL. L. REV. 415 (1964); Murphy, supra note 8; Note, 32 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1076 (1964).
a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's."'10 Further-
more, Mr. Justice Black's analysis of the history of the Constitution also
"reveals that. . . it was population which was to be the basis of the House
of Representatives."" Thus was established the proposition that "one
man-one vote" requires the congressional districts within a state to be of
equal population "as nearly as is practicable."
Beyond declaring that districts must be as equal in population as prac-
ticable, the Supreme Court's Wesberry decision failed to set down precise
standards.1 2 In Reynolds v. Sims,"3 the Court, for the first time, attempted
10. Wesberry v. Sanders, supra note 1, at 7-8 (emphasis added). The phrase
"as nearly as practicable" is a constitutional standard well established in law, rather
than one recently introduced into the political language of America by the United
States Supreme Court. In 1872, Congress directed that all congressional districts with-
in a state should contain "as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants."
Act of Feb. 2, 1872, c. 11, § 2, 17 Stat. 28 (1872). The same provision appears in
the Congressional Apportionment Acts of: (a) 1882, (Act of Feb. 25, 1882, c. 20
§ 3, 22 Stat. 5,6); (b) 1891 (Act of Feb. 7, 1891, c. 116, § 3, 4, 26 Stat. 735, 736);
(c) 1901 (Act of Jan. 16, 1901, c. 93, § 3, 4, 31 Stat. 733, 734); and (d) 1911
(Act of Aug. 8, 1911, c. 5, § 3, 37 Stat. 13, 14). The provision was deleted by the
Apportionment Act of 1929 (Act of June 18, 1929, 46 Stat. 21). Almost twenty-
five years later, President Truman recommended that Congress deal with congres-
sional malapportionment by requiring that districts "contain as nearly as practica-
ble the same number of individuals." Message from the President of the United
States, H. R. Doc. No. 36, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 9, 1951). Thus, for more than
ninety years the phrase "as nearly as practicable" has been a part of the language of
congressional districting. See generally Cellar, Congressional Apportionment-
Past, Present, and Future, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 268 (1952).
11. Wesberry v. Sanders, supra note 1, at 8-9. Mr. Justice Harlan does an effec-
tive job of demolishing Mr. Justice Black's historical argument by establishing that
the latter's historical facts prove nothing more than that it was intended that repre-
sentation of a state in the lower house of Congress should be determined on a
population basis as distinguished from the Senate where each state was to have two
representatives regardless of population. Wesberry v. Sanders, supra note 1, at
26-42. For further criticism of Mr. Justice Black's historical argument see Car-
penter, supra note 9, at 417-19 (1964); Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 119, 135-36; Note, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1076,
1095-1096 (1964).
12. Wesberry v. Sanders, supra note 1, at 21, n.4. Accord, Grills v. Branigin,
255 F. Supp. 155, 157 (S.D. Ind. 1966), rev'd per curiam sub. nom., Duddelston v.
Grills, 385 U.S. 455 (1967); Bush v. Martin, 251 F. Supp. 484, 518 (S.D. Tex.
1966) (Noel J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and Calkins v. Hare,
228 F. Supp. 824, 831-32 (E.D. Mich. 1964) (O'Sullivan J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
13. Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 6. Decided the same day as Reynolds were:
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Committee For Fair Rep-
resentation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695
(1964); and Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of the State of Colorado, 377
U.S. 713 (1964). For a general discussion of the reapportionment decisions see
DIXON, supra note 4, at 261-89; McKAY, supra note 7, at 99-145; Auerbach, supra
note 4; Carroll, The Legislative Apportionment Cases, 16 SYRAcusE L. REV. 55
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to establish guidelines defining the "as nearly as practicable" standard.
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, stated: "We determined
[in Wesberry] that the constitutional test for the validity of congressional
districting schemes was one of substantial equality of population among
the various districts."14  Moreover, the Court recognized that some minor
population deviations among intra-state voting districts were permissible so
long as they resulted from the use of political subdivision lines, or other
logical division lines, in the drawing of coherent districts. 5 The constitu-
tional wisdom in permitting deviations from the mathematical ideal, if
such lines were used in creating districts, was stated as follows: "Indis-
criminate districting, without any regard for political subdivision or natural
or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open invitation to
partisan gerrymandering.""' Hence, under the Wesberry-Reynolds formu-
lation, the phrase "as nearly as practicable" meant that congressional dis-
tricts within a state were to be substantially equal in population; minor
population variances among districts were acceptable if they resulted from
the use of political subdivision, natural, or historical boundary lines.' 7
With no better guidelines than this, it is not surprising that state legis-
latures moved in opposite directions in the period between 1964 and 1966.
On the one hand, a large number of state legislatures chose to construct
their congressional districts along political subdivision lines, permitting
some population variances so long as they were not excessive.' s For exam-
ple, in Bush v. Martin a three-judge federal district court ruled that a maxi-
mum deviation from the ideal of ten to fifteen per cent (plus or minus)
(1964); Cassin, Reapportionment: The Problem That Will Not Go Away, 3 HOUST.
L. REV. 310 (1966); Note, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1226 (1966); Note, 33 U. GIN. L. REV.
483 (1964).
14. Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 6, at 559 (emphasis added).
15. Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 6, at 578.
16. Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 6, at 578-79.
17. See Bush v. Martin, supra note 12, at 510-11; Meeks v. Avery, 251 F. Supp.
245, 252 (D. Kans. 1966); Moore v. Moore, 246 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Ala.
1965); Silver v. Reagan, 62 Cal. Reptr. 424, 428, 432 P.2d 26, 30 (1967); People v.
Kerner, 33 Ill. 2d 460, 462, 211 N.E.2d 736, 737 (1965); Jones v. Falcey, 48 N.J.
25, 40, 222 A.2d 101, 109 (1966); Wilkins v. Davis, 205 Va. 803, 809, 139 S.E.2d
849, 855 (1965).
18. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 425 (Supp. 1967); COLO. REV. STAT. § 28-1-1
(1966); IDAHO CODE C. 19, §§ 34-1902 to -1903 (Supp. 1967); ILL. REV. STAT. C. 46
§ 156 f.l (1967); Ky. REV. STAT. § 120.070 (Supp. 1966); ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 23,
§ 250.290(1) (1967); S.C. CODE ANN. C. 9, § 23-554 (Supp. 1968); S.D. CODE
§ 1-3-1 (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-10-3 (1965); VA. CODE C. 1, § 24-3 (1969);
REV. CODE OF WASH. §§ 29.68.012-.067 (Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-2-3
(Supp. 1969). See generally Congressional Redistricting: Redistricting Action Re-
viewed State-by-State For The Years 1960-1966, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, Vol.
XXIV, pp. 2004-139, Sept. 16, 1966.
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was justified by a Texas legislative policy of respecting political subdivision
lines. 19 On the other hand, a small number of state legislatures sought
to achieve near-absolute mathematical equality among its districts by
disregarding, whenever necessary, political subdivision lines.20  In Michi-
gan, for example, the state legislature cut across county lines in twelve of
nineteen congressional districts to achieve a plan with a maximum devia-
tion from the average of 2.1 per cent.2' Contrasting the above two
approaches leads to one conclusion: while the near-absolute equality
theory produces plans with smaller population disparities, it also enhances
the opportunity for unfair districting practices by giving reapportioners
carte blanche to ignore traditional boundary lines.
Nevertheless, a trend toward adopting the near-absolute equality ap-
proach began to develop. In Maryland Citizens Committee for Fair
Congressional Redistricting, Inc. v. Tawes, a three-judge district court,
after holding unconstitutional the 1965 Maryland Congressional Redistrict-
ing Act, prescribed its own scheme, which allowed a difference of 9,973
between the population of the largest and smallest district.22  The most
outstanding feature of the court plan was the splitting of Baltimore County
among four separate districts, Anne Arundel County among three districts,
and little Howard County between two districts.2a On May 31, 1966, the
Supreme Court upheld the Maryland district court's plan.2 4 The Courts'
affirmance in Tawes clearly established the constitutionality of ignoring
traditional political subdivisions in congressional districting cases. As
Chief Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court has pointed out:
"[once] the lines of political subdivisions are ignored, there is no apparent
reason for not achieving mathematical equality. ''25 Hence, the Tawes
decision represents the first clear indication that the Supreme Court was on
19. Bush v. Martin, supra note 12, at 511. Accord, Moore v. Moore, supra note
17, at 582-83; Grills v. Branigin, supra note 12, at 158; Silver v. Reagan, supra note
17, at 428, 432 P.2d at 30. Several state reapportionment cases have also held that
a ten to fifteen per cent maximum deviation (plus or minus) from the ideal com-
plies with the Supreme Court's guidelines. Yancey v. Faubus, 251 F. Supp. 998
(E.D. Ark. 1965), aff'd per curiam sub. nom., Crawford County Bar Assoc. v. Fau-
bus, 383 U.S. 271 (1966); and Toombs v. Fortson, 241 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga.
1965), a! 'd per curiam, 384 U.S. 210 (1966). But see Reynolds v. Sims, supra
note 6, at 578; and Roman v. Sincock, supra note 13, at 710.
20. KANS. STAT. ANN. § 4-121 to -126 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. CODE Art. 33,
§ 159 (1967); MICH. STAT. ANN. C. 17, § 4.24(1) (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 3 (Supp. 1967).
21. MICH. STAT. ANN. c. 17, § 4.24(1) (1969).
22. 253 F. Supp. 731 (D. Md. 1966).
23. Id. at 735-37.
24. Alton v. Tawes, 384 U.S. 315 (1966).
25. Jones v. Falcey, supra note 17, at 37, 222 A.2d at 108.
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the verge of adopting a more rigid mathematical equality standard in the
area of congressional districting.
In a series of state legislative and congressional districting decisions
early in 1967, the Supreme Court reevaluated its interpretation of the
"one man-one vote" principle. The leading case was Swann v. Adams,2 6
wherein the Supreme Court nullifed Florida's reapportionment statute,
which was, on arithmetic grounds, one of the more equitable plans in the
nation. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice White, stated the new
guidelines thusly:
De minimis deviations are unavoidable, but variations of 30% among senate and
40% among house districts can hardly be deemed de minimis, and none of our cases
suggests that differences of this magnitude will be approved without a satisfactory
explanation grounded on an acceptable state policy. 27
From this statement the basic burden of proof emerged: except for de
minimis population variances, all deviations from the districting norm
must be justified by the state on some rationally permissible principle.
The Swann decision is significant because it did not make absolute
mathematical equality the rule in state reapportionment cases. Mr. Justice
White's opinion for the majority stated that there were two possible legal
excuses for variances from the equal-population principle. First, devia-
tions could be justified by the implementation of an "acceptable state
policy," such as maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions, pro-
viding for compact districts of contiguous territory and recognizing natural
or historical boundary lines. 28  Secondly, Swann recognized that the de
minimis doctrine applied to state reapportionment cases.2 9
The legal phrase "de minimis non curat lex" means, "[tihe law does
not care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling matters. '30 In several
lower court decisions, the phrase de minimis has been used to explain
26. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
27. Id. at 444. According to Dean McKay, by the end of 1967 the reappor-
tionment plans in more than thirty states appeared to satisfy the Swann guidelines.
McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT REAPPRAISED 14 (1968).
28. Supra note 26, at 444.
29. Supra note 26, at 444. The first Supreme Court case to mention the phrase
de minimis was Baker v. Carr. Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Baker
suggested that the variances in the 1901 Tennessee state apportionment were only
de minimis from an apportionment formula established by the Tennessee Constitu-
tion. Mr. Justice Clark countered by stating that Mr. Justice Harlan's efforts to
justify variances by referring to "such generalities as . . . 'de minimis' departures
[are shown by] even a casual glance at the present apportionment picture . . .to be
entirely fanciful." Baker v. Carr, supra note 6, at 258. In Swann Mr. Justice White
apparently adopts Mr. Justice Harlan's position that the de minimis doctrine justifies
population variances.
30. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 482 (4th ed. 1951).
[Vol. XIX
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minor departures from the mathematical ideal.3 1 A Nebraska federal court
has succinctly stated the applicable rule: "[I]f the deviations are minor,
that in itself may be a justification for any plan."'3 2 The Swann opinion
adopts the same position, holding that if the deviations are of a de minimis
nature, the plan should be judicially approved. Hence, in state reappor-
tionment cases, population deviations could be justified by two considera-
tions-the doctrine of de minimis deviation or the effectuation of an ac-
ceptable state policy.
On the same day as the Swann decision, the Supreme Court summarily
disposed of two congressional districting cases. The Court's brief per curi-
am decisions in Duddleston v. Grillsa  and Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (Kirk-
patrick I)3 4 indicated the importance of Swann in congressional dis-
tricting. In Grills, an Indiana district court ruled that a 1.2 to 1 popu-
lation variance ratio and a 12.8 per cent maximum deviation from the norm
did not render the 1965 Indiana districting plan constitutionally invalid.85
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the lower court judgment and
remanded for further consideration in light of Swann, Wesberry and Rey-
nolds.3 6  By simply citing the Swann ruling as authority, the Supreme
Court indicated that proponents of any districting plan had the burden of
justifying deviations from equality.37 Left unanswered was the question of
what factors would excuse population deviations among intra-state dis-
tricts. Did the Swann state reapportionment factors-"acceptable state
policy" or "de minimis"-apply to population variances in congressional
redistricting?
While some lower courts3 8 construed the reversal in Grills to mean
31. Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp. 609, 612 (D. Neb. 1968); Kilgarlin v.
Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404, 414 (S.D. Tex. 1966), rev'd per curiam sub. nom.,
Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Preisler II, supra note 2, at 973; Calkins v.
Hare, supra note 12, at 829.
32. Exon v. Tiemann, supra note 31, at 612.
33. 385 U.S. 455 (1967).
34. Kirkpatrick I, supra note 2.
35. Grills v. Branigin, supra note 12, at 158-59.
36. Supra note 33.
37. Supra note 37. Accord, Preisler III, supra note 5, at 960; Wells v. Rocke-
feller, 273 F. Supp. 984, 989 (S.D. N.Y. 1967), aff'd per curtain, 389 U.S. 421
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Wells I]; Maryland Citizens Committee For Fair
Congressional Districting, Inc. v. Tawes, supra note 22, at 733; Drum v. Seawell,
250 F. Supp. 922, 924 (M.D. N.C. 1966); Drum v. Seawell, 249 F. Supp. 877, 880
(M.D. N.C. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 383 U.S. 831 (1966); Calkins v. Hare, supra
note 12, at 827; Jones v. Falcey, supra note 17, at 37, 222 A.2d at 109.
38. Dinis v. Volpe, 264 F. Supp. 425, 430 (D. Mass. 1967), ajf'd per curiain,
389 U.S. 570 (1968) (dictum); Exon v. Tiemann, supra note 31, at 612; Preisler
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that the acceptable state policy considerations established in Swann were
applicable to congressional districting cases, the true answer was to be
found in Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri (Preisler II). In
that case, the Supreme Court sustained a federal district court decision
invalidating a Missouri congressional districting plan in which the max-
imum deviation from the mean was only 9.9 per cent.8 9 The opin-
ion of Judge John W. Oliver was especially perceptive. He inter-
preted the Supreme Court's rulings subsequent to Wesberry as holding
that "population alone is the sole standard for congressional representa-
tion."'40  In responding to the contention that the population discrepancies
did not exceed 9.9 per cent, Judge Oliver refused "'to be drawn into a
sterile controversy over averages and percentages,' "41 since "the constitu-
tional right of equal representation may [not] be but slightly, and
therefore permissibly, abridged."' 42  He concluded by stating that "any
variation above that permitted by a fair application of the doctrine of de
minimus, factually supported, must be held to be an abridgment of rights
guaranteed by . . . the Constitution. ' 43 Thus, in place of the sub-
stantial equality formulation enunciated in Reynolds, the new guideline
established by the Court's per curiam affirmances in Tawes and Preisler
II seemed to be that the state must achieve bare population equality
among its voting districts, subject only to de minimis deviations.
Even though Swann and Preisler II present conflicting views as to the
applicability of non-population factors, a comparison of these cases re-
veals that both employed the same test: review of suggested alternative
plans as a means of testing compliance with the equal-population principle.
In each of the cases the complaining parties had either themselves sug-
gested, or could point to, an alternative plan not adopted by the legis-
lature under which deviations would have been minimized.44  In Swann,
the Supreme Court commented on the significance of alternative plans:
III, supra note 5, at 1009 n. 4 (Matthes J., dissenting); Wells I, supra note 37, at
989 (dictum); Silver v. Reagan, supra note 17, at 428, 432 P.2d at 30.
39. Preisler II, supra note 2. It is little wonder that the Court's per curiam af-
firmances in Wells I, supra note 37, and Kirkpatrick I, supra note 2, led to con-
siderable judicial confusion. As Mr. Justice Harlan stated in his dissenting opinion
in Wells I: "All this has the effect of leaving the state legislatures, the lower courts,
and even Congress without meaningful guidance." Supra note 37, at 423.
40. Supra note 2, at 973 (emphasis added); accord, Connor v. Johnson, 279 F.
Supp. 619, 623 (S.D. Miss. 1967), a/f'd per curiam on other grounds, 386 U.S. 483
(1967); Calkins v. Hare, supra note 12, at 829; Meeks v. Anderson, 229 F. Supp. 271,
273 (D. Kan. 1964).
41. Supra note 2, at 974; accord, Calkins v. Hare, supra note 12, at 828.
42. Supra note 2, at 974.
43. Supra note 2, at 976.
44. Swann v. Adams, supra note 26, at 445; Preisler II, supra note 2, at 963.
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[I]t seems quite obvious that the State could have come much closer to providing
districts of equal population than it did. The appellants themselves placed before
the court their own plan which revealed much smaller variations between the dis-
tricts than did the plan approved by the District Court.
45
The Missouri District Court in Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri
(Preisler III) elaborated on this proposition:
The standard "as nearly as practicable" means . . . if plans before a court establish
that more equal districting was obtainable than that which was adopted, then obvi-
ously the plan enacted . . . does not meet the constitutional command.4 6
In other words, if the population variances within a plan can be reduced,
then the plan is unconstitutional. Thus, as Professor Dixon stated, "a
new maxim of 'constitutional equity' is born: That which may be made
more equal is not equal.' 47
In Kilgarlin v. Hill,4 decided late in 1967, the Supreme Court continued
to tighten the arithmetic equality principle. A three-judge district court
had upheld a Texas reapportionment plan even though there was a maxi-
mum deviation of 14.84 per cent. In sustaining the plan the lower court
attempted to create an elaborate burden of proof formula. According to
the Texas court, de minimis variations were considered to be constitu-
tionally permissible; per se variations were held to be constitutionally
void; and all cases in the middle area of the mathematical scale would be
constitutionally permissible unless the plaintiff was able to "negate the
existence of any state of facts which would sustain the constitutionality
of the legislation. ' '49  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the bur-
den of proof rule established by Swann was controlling. 50 The Court did
not even discuss the elaborate lower court formulation that included de
minimis as a conceptual part of its involved theory of percentage and
ratio justification. Consequently, the Court's reversal in Kilgarlin was at
least an implicit rejection of any notion that the de minimis doctrine could
be converted into an independent justification of population disparities. 51
Apart from its repudiation of the de minimis doctrine, Kilgarlin is im-
45. Supra note 26, at 445; accord, Dinis v. Volpe, supra note 38, at 428-29;
Bush v. Martin, supra note 12, at 509; Baker v. Clement, 247 F. Supp. 886, 896
(M.D. Tenn. 1965); Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp. 36, 41, 44 (D. N. Dak. 1965);
League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 242 F. Supp. 357, 360-61 (D. Neb.
1965); Koziol v. Burkhardt, 51 N.J. 412, 416, 241 A.2d 451, 453 (1968); Jones v.
Falcey, supra note 17, at 37, 222 A.2d at 107-08.
46. Preisler III, supra note 5, at 990.
47. DIxoN, supra note 4, at 447 (1968) (emphasis added).
48. 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
49. Kilgarlin v. Martin, supra note 31, at 414.
50. Supra note 48, at 122.
51. Preisler III, supra note 5, at 964; see DIXON, supra note 4, at 449.
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portant for another reason. In Kilgarlin the district court also attempted
to justify the state plan as the product of "a bona fide attempt to conform
to the state policy requiring legislative apportionment plans to respect
county boundaries wherever possible. '52 The Supreme Court rejected the
district court's contention, stating that since state policy permitted cutting
of some county lines to avoid "undue" population deviations, it was in-
cumbent on the state to show why a few more should not be cut to further
reduce population variances. 53 The thought expressed in this proposition
had significant implications in the area of congressional districting.
In Tawes the Supreme Court recognized the propriety of cutting some
political subdivision lines to reduce population disparities among congres-
sional districts.54 Under the Kilgarlin approach the burden was on the
state to explain why more subdivision lines could not have been cut to fur-
ther reduce the population variances. Since Swann required the state to
adopt the most mathematically precise plan possible, an existing statute
would have to be declared unconstitutional whenever a plan was placed
in evidence before a court which showed more equal districting was
possible by disregarding a few more subdivision lines. The Tawes-Swann-
Kilgarlin approach, if carried to its logical conclusion, could lead to only
one result: the state would have to ignore all county, township, ward
and precinct lines in attempting to achieve near-absolute mathematical
equality among districts. As a Kansas district court has stated: "[U]nder
a plan of reapportionment which ignores political subdivision lines, it is
not permissible to deviate from the equal population principle."'55 The
implications of Kilgarlin erased any further doubt that the Court was
headed toward an absolute mathematical equality rule.
The Supreme Court's 1968 reapportionment decisions were a further
extension of its increasingly rigid interpretation of the "one man-one vote"
principle. In Dinis v. Volpe5" the Supreme Court affirmed, per curian, a
Massachusetts district court decision voiding a congressional districting
plan with maximum deviations of plus 11.7 per cent and minus 12.4 per
cent.57 The opinion of Judge Woodbury was of extreme importance be-
cause it previewed the legal rationale for rejecting the de minimis doctrine
as a justification for population variances. Judge Woodbury recognized
52. Supra note 48, at 122-23.
53. Supra note 48, at 123.
54. 253 F. Supp. 731 (D. Md. 1966), aff'd per curiam sub nom., Alton v. Tawes,
384 U.S. 315 (1966).
55. Long v. Docking, 282 F. Supp. 256, 258 (D. Kan. 1968).
56. 389 U.S. 570 (1968).
57. Dinis v. Volpe, supra note 38, at 431.
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that figures are essential in determining whether population variances are
de minimis, or excessive. However, districting disputes are not to be
decided "by application of any mathematical formula. s58 The proper ap-
proach is to determine whether the districting plan meets the standard of
practicability, with reference to the specific situation present in the state
involved.59 Measured by this guideline, Judge Woodbury found that the
Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional. His ruling was based on the
fact that two other plans in evidence before the Court showed it was pos-
sible to provide districts more nearly equal in population. ° Therefore, the
aim in congressional districting is not to establish rigid mathematical stand-
ards (equality within a certain fixed percentage), but to construct districts
as nearly of equal population as is possible.
The events in Massachusetts following the district court's decision
are worthy of comment. Forced to redistrict by the Dinis ruling, the
state legislature enacted a congressional districting plan which ignored
county lines completely to secure a measure of equality in which the
maximum deviation was only 1.1 per cent, and the population of the
most populous district exceeded that of the least populous by only 8,717,
a difference of 2.1 per cent. 61 Interestingly enough, the remarkable de-
gree of equality achieved in Massachusetts did not involve sacrifice of all
political subdivision lines as district boundaries. The more important
town and city lines were respected.62 The Massachussets' districting plan
is significant because it showed that state legislatures had shifted from a
policy of cutting some political subdivision lines to one of disregarding all
but the most important lines.
On April 1, 1968, in Avery v. Midland County63 the Supreme Court
ruled that the equal-population principle applies to units of local govern-
ment. The circumstances under which the Court took jurisdiction indicated
that it was on the verge of rejecting any non-population factor that might
58. Dinis v. Volpe, supra note 38, at 429.
59. Dinis v. Volpe, supra note 38, at 429.
60. Dinis v. Volpe, supra note 38, at 429; see authorities cited supra note 45.
61. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 57, § 1 (Supp. 1969). Other states that adopted
an approach of cutting political subdivision lines are: Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3521.01 (Supp. 1968); and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. c. 5, § 2-502
(Supp. 1968).
62. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 57, § 1 (Supp. 1969).
63. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). See generally Dixon, Local Representation: Consti-
tutional Mandates and Apportionment Options, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693 (1968);
Martin, The Supreme Court and Local Reapportionment: The Second Phase, 21
BAYLOR L. REV. 5 (1969); McKay, Reapportionment and Local Government, 36
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 713 (1968); Sentell, Avery v. Midland County: Reapportion-
ment and Local Government Revisited, 3 GA. L. REV. 110 (1968).
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provide permissible grounds for deviating from a standard of strict popu-
lation equality. In Avery, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Com-
missioner's Court of Midland County was so apportioned as to violate the
requirements of the Texas and United States Constitutions.6 4  However,
the Texas court further stated that population need not be the sole basis of
apportionment, and such factors as the "number of qualified voters, land
areas, geography, miles of county roads and taxable values" 65 could be
considered in drawing district lines.
Arguably, there was an adequate state ground for the Texas Supreme
Court's decision and it was clear that a new plan of apportionment would
be drawn. Assuming that this was the case, it appears that the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to deny the Texas Court's assertion that factors
other than population could be considered in a new districting scheme.
Justice Fortas' dissenting opinion accurately evaluated the majority's
position:
The Court . . . now plunges to adjudication of the case . . . in midstream, appar-
ently because it rejects any result that might emerge which deviates from the
literal thrust of one man, one vote. 60
Hence, in Avery the Court determined that units of local government
with general powers over a particular area must be apportioned on the
basis of strict population equality.
Any conjecture that the strict population equality standard prescribed in
A very applied only to local governmental units was laid to rest in Kirkpat-
rick v. Preisler (Kirkpatrick 11)67 and the Wells v. Rockefeller (Wells II)
case.0 8 In Kirkpatrick 11, Missouri's primary argument was that the
variances created by the 1967 Missouri districting act are so small they
"should be considered de minimis and for that reason to satisfy the 'as
64. Avery v. Midland County, 406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1966).
65. Id. at 428.
66. Supra note 63, at 496 (Fortas J., dissenting).
67. 394 U.S. 526 (1969), rehearing denied, 395 U.S. 917 (1969).
68. 394 U.S. 542 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wells II]. New York's 1968
congressional districting statute was attacked on the grounds that it failed to com-
ply with the "as nearly as practicable" standard. The heart of the New York dis-
tricting scheme lay in the decision by the state legislature to treat seven sections of
the state as homogeneous regions and divide each of these regions into districts of
virtually identical population. However, on a state-wide basis New York's forty-one
congressional districts ranged from 26,556 people (6.488 per cent) above the mean
to 27,047 people (6.608 per cent) below the mean. The Supreme Court, relying on
Kirkpatrick II ruled that the New York plan was unconstitutional because the objec-
tive in congressional districting is "to equalize population in all districts of the State
and is not satisfied by equalizing population only within defined substates." Id.
at 546.
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nearly as practicable' limitation."69  Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for
the Court, rejected Missouri's de minimis argument, holding that there is
no "fixed numerical or percentage population variance small enough to
be considered de minimis and to satisfy without question the 'as nearly
as practicable' standard. '70 Having disposed of the de minimis doctrine,
Mr. Justice Brennan proceeded to define "one man-one vote" to mean
that the state must make "a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathe-
matical equality"71 of population among the congressional districts within
a state.
However, in Kirkpatrick II, as in Wesberry and Reynolds, the Supreme
Court recognized that " 'it may not be possible [for the States] to draw
congressional districts with mathematical precision.' "72 Consequently,
article 1, § 2 of the Constitution permits "limited population variances
which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equal-
ity, or for which justification is shown."'7 3 To comply with the standard
of unavoidability, Kirkpatrick II requires a population deviation to
satisfy three criteria. First, a deviation from the districting norm must
not exceed 12,000 people.74  Secondly, it cannot result from the use of
inaccurate population figures.75 Finally, a deviation cannot be considered
unavoidable unless the apportioning body has come "as close to equality
as it might have come."' 76 This means that whenever it becomes appar-
ent that the apportioning body could have districted the particular state
in a more nearly equal manner, the population deviation can no longer be
considered unavoidable. Consequently, unless the population variance
can be justified by a legally acceptable reason, the districting statute must
be declared unconstitutional so long as the plaintiff can point to another
plan which would mathematically redistrict the state with greater equality.
Following the implications of Swann and Duddleston, the Court's Kirk-
patrick I1 opinion requires proponents of congressional districting plans
to present acceptable reasons for the variations among the populations of
the various districts. Mr. Justice Brennan, however, proceeds to discard
69. Supra note 67, at 530.
70. Supra note 67, at 530. Only Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White hold that
the de minimis doctrine should apply to congressional districting disputes. Supra
note 67, at 550 (Harlan J. and Stewart J., dissenting) and 553 (White J., dissenting).
71. Supra note 67, at 530-31 (emphasis added).
72. Supra note 67, at 527; Wesberry v. Sanders, supra note 6, at 18; Reynolds
v. Sims, supra note 6, at 577.
73. Supra note 67, at 531.
74. Supra note 67, at 528, 532.
75. Supra note 67, at 532.
76. Supra note 67, at 531.
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every non-population factor that has been-possibly, every one that could
be-advanced."7  He rejects such considerations as the representation of
distinct economic and social interests;78 "practical political problems; '79
the integrity of political subdivisions;80 and geographic compactness.8 1 In
Reynolds, Chief Justice Warren observed that "[c]itizens, not history or
economic interests, cast votes."8s2 Under the principles established by Kirk-
patrick II it would be equally correct to state that "citizens, not political
subdivisions, or geographic areas, cast votes." Thus, in implementing the
Supreme Court's "one man-one vote" standard, the formula for change is
crystal clear-strict equality of population.
The remainder of this note will critically evaluate the guidelines estab-
lished by Kirkpatrick II. These guidelines are logically consistent with
the Court's narrow view of the redistricting issue. From the beginning,
the Court has viewed a congressional districting case as a voting case,
resting on each citizen's right to have his vote counted and weighted
equally.8 3 As a result, the objective in congressional districting is "not to
meet a minimum mathematical standard, but to come as close as possible
77. Supra note 67, at 533-36. Apparently, the only nonpopulation factor that
would justify population deviations is a state policy of constructing congressional
districts of contiguous territory. The only appropriate population factor seems to be
the use of population trends in constructing districts. However, the Court further
stated: "By this we mean to open no avenue for subterfuge. Findings as to popu-
lation trends must be thoroughly documented and applied throughout the State in a
systematic . . . manner." Kirkpatrick II, supra note 67, at 535.
78. Supra note 67, at 533; Wells II, supra note 68, at 546; Reynolds v. Sims,
supra note 6, at 579-80; Lucas v. Fourty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado,
supra note 13, at 738.
79. Supra note 67, at 533; accord, Preisler II, supra note 5, at 989; Drum v.
Seawell, 250 F. Supp. 922, 925 (M.D. N.C. 1966); Calkins v. Hare, supra note 12,
at 828. However, as a federal court recognized in Moore v. Moore, supra note 17,
at 582: "Although constitutional rights and principles cannot be ignored or made
subordinate to political expediency, courts recognize the fact that legislative bodies
in a democracy do not, and cannot perform and function according to a slide rule.
. . .Democracy does not operate in that fashion. There remains the necessity of
giving consideration to all legitimate contentions, interests and other appropriate
factors involved in the legislative process."
80. Supra note 67, at 533-34; Wells 1I, supra note 68, at 546.
81. Supra note 67, at 535-36; Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 6, at 580. See
generally DIXON, supra note 4, at 460-61; HACKER, supra note 9, at 74-7.
82. Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 6, at 580.
83. Wesberry v. Sanders, supra note 1, at 7; DIXON, supra note 4, at 267-71;
Irwin, Representation and Election: The Reapportionment Cases in Retrospect, 67
Mica. L. REV. 729, 747-53 (1969); Jewell, Minority Representation: A Political
or Judicial Question, 53 Ky. L. J. 267, 268-71 (1965); see generally Weiss, An
Analysis of Wesberry v. Sanders, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 67 (1965).
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to a solution which treats each voter on an equal basis. '84 The appellant's
de minimis argument in Kirkpatrick II conflicts with the above stated
principle, for it seeks to establish that a three per cent maximum deviation
from the norm satisfies the "as nearly as practicable limitation."8 5 As Mr.
Justice Brennan pointed out, "[t]he whole thrust of the 'as nearly as
practicable' approach is inconsistent with adoption of fixed numerical
standards."8 6  Obviously, the most mathematically precise plan possible
is one that achieves absolute equality, and thus, the goal in congressional
districting is to achieve mathematical exactness.
This rigid interpretation of "one man-one vote" can be justified on
several grounds. In the first place, with half of Congress apportioned on
a non-population basis, it is only proper that the other House should
comply with a strict population equality standard. Secondly, a goal of
"mathematical exactitude . . . certainly is capable of clear definition
and, as [an objective], it establishes a clear target at which to shoot."87
However, the guidelines enunciated in Kirkpatrick II lead to a number
of undesirable results. First, Kirkpatrick II represents a further intrusion
of the judiciary into congressional matters. Mr. Justice Harlan has pointed
out that article I of the Constitution commits to Congress the ultimate
authority to legislate with respect to congressional districts.88 Congress
did legislate in this area for some years, but it later repealed this legis-
lation and thereby left the fixing of congressional districts to the discretion
of state legislatures.89  In Wesberry, the Supreme Court entered the
"political thicket" of congressional districting and required that districts
set up under state law must, as nearly as practicable, be equal in popula-
tion. Wesberry can possibly be interpreted to mean that the standard
stated by the Court is the one to be followed by the states in the absence
of standards stated by Congress. But in Kirkpatrick II the Court clearly
demonstrates that it has now fixed a single constitutional standard for
congressional districting and there is no room for congressional deviation
84. Brief for Appellee at 19, Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (Kirkpatrick II), supra note
67.
85. Supra note 67, at 531.
86. Supra note 67, at 531; Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
87. Brief for Appellee at 9, Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (Kirkpatrick II), supra note
67.
88. Wesberry v. Sanders, supra note 1, at 42.
89. See generally Wesberry v. Sanders, supra note 1, at 42-45 (Harlan J., dis-
senting); HACKER, supra note 9, at 48-49; McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW
AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 229-31 (1965); Black, Inequities in Dis-
tricting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13, 18-21
(1962); Celler, supra note 10.
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from this standard. Thus, the Wesberry-Kirkpatrick II formulation repre-
sents a substantial judicial intrusion upon congressional power.
Another feature of the Kirkpatrick II case that deserves special attention
is the Court's emphasis on "equal representation for equal numbers of
people." 90 Mr. Justice Brennan's use of the phrase "equal representation"
suggests that beyond the citizen's right of electoral expression, he has a
comparable right to equal or proportionate attention from the law-
makers themselves. But "it was not . . . by any word or hint 'our Consti-
tution's plain objective' to guarantee equality of representation; in fact,
there is every evidence to the contrary."'91 In addition, the Court unques-
tioningly assumes that "equal representation" magically arises from creat-
ing districts of equal population. Yet, the relation between representative
and constituent is neither so direct, nor so simple. Congressmen are, in
practice, responsive to group pressures and the legislative output is often a
result of coalitions of minority interests . 2 The general tendency of legis-
lators to specialize, becoming experts in certain areas while deferring to
their colleagues on other matters, further estranges them from the inno-
cent effort to provide "equal representation to equal numbers of people. '93
To mention these factors is merely to suggest the complexitiy of the prob-
lem of "equal representation," a problem which cannot be resolved by the
equal-population districting standard.
Furthermore, as Justices Harlan 4 and White 95 demonstrate, the ma-
jority's insistence on absolute equality does not make sense even on its own
terms. On the one hand, the Court's decision requires precise adherence
to admittedly inexact census figures. Mr. Justice Fortas' concurring
opinion clearly demonstrates that "[n]o purpose is served by an insistence
on precision which is unattainable because . . . it is based upon figures
which are always to some degree obsolete." 9  On the other hand, the
Court rejects the use of political subdivision lines as a legally acceptable
justification for population variances, and hence, downgrades a restraint
90. Supra note 67, at 530-31.
91. Irwin, supra note 83, at 751; accord, Kauper, Some Comments on the Re-
apportionment Cases, 63 MICH. L. REV. 243, 247 (1964).
92. See Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 1, at 623-24 (Harlan J., dissenting); Lucas
v. Fourty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, supra note 13, at 750 (Stewart J.,
dissenting); DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 115 (1956); KEY, POLITICS,
PARTIES & PRESSURE GROUPS 132-38 (5th ed. 1964); LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS
OF POLITICS 1-54 (1952); TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 14-26, 33-39(1955); Jewell, supra note 83, at 268; Irwin, supra note 83, at 747.
93. Irwin, supra note 83, at 746.
94. Supra note 67, at 559 (Harlan J., dissenting).
95. Supra note 67, at 553 (White J., dissenting).
96. Supra note 67, at 539 (Fortas J., concurring).
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on a far greater potential threat to equality of representation-gerryman-
dering.
The fact of the matter is that the rule of absolute equality is perfectly compatible
with "gerrymandering" of the worst sort. A computer may grind out district lines
which can totally frustrate the popular will on an overwhelming number of critical
issues.9 7
Thus, "[i]f the Court believes it has struck a blow. . . for fully responsive
representative democracy, it is sorely mistaken."98
Finally, the guidelines enunciated in Kirkpatrick II will result in an
"unnecessary intrusion of the judiciary into state legislative business." 99
In Reynolds, the Supreme Court stated that "reapportionment is primarily
a matter for legislative consideration and determination." 10 0  But the
Court's reliance on the "alternative districting plan" device necessarily
leads to the conclusion that if in the judgment of the Court, not the legis-
lature, a plan providing for greater equality in representation can be formu-
lated, the legislature's plan must fail. It would seem, therefore, that only
the courts can ultimately assume and properly complete the task of con-
gressional districting-involving "the courts in the abrasive task of draw-
ing district lines."''1
Even the courts, however, will be beset with difficulties in formulating
plans to comply with the unduly strict and unrealistic standards enunciated
by the majority in Kirkpatrick II. Judicial redistricting is an impossible
task for a court acting on its own with no more guidance than a standard
of population equality. Once political subdivisions and other non-popu-
lation factors are ignored, there are, theoretically, an infinite number of
ways to divide a state into districts of absolute population equality.10 2
It is no answer to this dilemma to contend that the court only has to turn
to one of the plans submitted by the parties before it or to an amalgamation
of several plans. Certainly, a court should not accept blindly the proposals
submitted to it by the litigants. Usually, the plaintiffs represent some
97. Supra note 67, at 551; Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 1, at 578-79. In
Wells II the issue of partisan gerrymandering was raised but not decided. For a
general discussion of the issue of gerrymandering and the legal problems it creates
see DIXON, supra note 4, at 458-99; Jewell, supra note 83; McKAY, supra note 27, at
32-4.
98. Supra note 67, at 552 (Harlan J., dissenting).
99. Supra note 67, at 555 (White J., dissenting). "The Court may be groping
for a clean-cut, per se rule which will minimize confrontations between courts and
legislatures. . . . If so, the Court is wide of the mark. Today's result simply
shifts the area of dispute a few percentage points down the scale." Id.
100. Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 1, at 586.
101. Supra note 67, at 553 (White J., dissenting).
102. Supra note 67, at 556 (White J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, supra note
1, at 621-22 (Harlan J., dissenting); DIXON, supra note 4, at 268.
1969] CASE NOTES
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
special interest group, not the broad spectrum of the interests of the entire
state population. Additionally, there has been a breakdown of the adver-
sary method in some apportionment cases. Often, both plaintiffs and de-
fendants assert that a state's districting scheme is unconstitutional.
0 3
Thus, it becomes not only a mental task of unattainable proportions, but
also, in terms of judicial workload, almost a physical impossibility for a
court to objectively sift through the myriad proposals and select, or piece
together, the "best" possible plan.
Moreover, it must be remembered that one of the prime goals of litiga-
tion over constitutional claims is that finality be achieved as quickly as
possible. From this perspective a very real hazard of the "alternative
districting plan" approach is that plaintiff-attack is made too easy on a
mere showing that a more "equal" plan is possible. Under the standing
rules of Baker v. Carr,10 4 any dissatisfied voter can be a plaintiff and thus
prevent finality in apportionment, even though the two major parties and
all significant groups are satisfied with a particular plan. Thus, as long as
diligent plaintiffs are around to challenge the constitutionality of a district-
ing scheme, the courts will be inextricably involved in the districting proc-
ess.
It is even questionable whether the proposals submitted by these plain-
tiffs can properly be referred to as districting plans. For example, in re-
apportioning the State of New York, the state apportionment committee
spent over 2,570 man hours attempting to draw new district lines.' 05 The
technicians employed by the legislature made use of legislative maps ex-
ceeding thirty feet in length. 106 It is extremely doubtful whether a private
citizen, without these resources, can draw districts with adequate de-
scriptions. In Wells I, a consultant for the New York Legislature testi-
fied that he was unable to draw a map of appellant's plan in Nassau
County because of its inadequate descriptions. 10 7 Thus, the "alternative
districting plan" device leads to the anomalous result of a court in-
validating a legislative districting scheme because a plaintiff-voter is
able to produce an inexact plan with smaller population variances.
To conclude: In Wesberry v. Sanders the Supreme Court ruled that
"as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to
be worth as much as another's."' 08  Measured by this standard, the
103. Dixon, Apportionment Standards and Judicial Power, 38 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 367, 372-75 (1963).
104. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
105. Brief for Appellees at 17, Wells v. Rockefeller (Wells II), supra note 68.
106. Id. at 16.
107. Id. at 16-17.
108. Wesberry v. Sanders, supra note 1, at 7-8.
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Court found that Georgia's congressional districting scheme, with a maxi-
mum deviation from the ideal of 108.9 per cent, was unconstitutional.
In Kirkpatrick II, the Court now holds that even a three per cent maximum
deviation from the districting norm fails to satisfy the "as nearly as practi-
cable" limitation. While the districting statute invalidated in Wesberry
grossly discriminated against voters in the larger congressional districts,
the same cannot be said of the Missouri districting scheme. Where the
greatest disparity among districts produces a situation in which one citizen
casts a vote that was 97 per cent of the vote of a citizen in another district,
it is doubtful whether such a differential can amount to a constitutional in-
jury except in a purely abstract sense.
It would seem, therefore, that the Court rejects the Missouri plan be-
cause the state legislature considered factors other than population in dis-
charging the command of article 1, § 2 of the Constitution. Thus, what is
really involved in Kirkpatrick II is not a discriminatory denial of the right
to vote, but rather a violation of the judicially created right to a system
that recognizes numbers as the only basis for representation. Conse-
quently, constitutional rectitude in congressional districting must be
achieved in the following manner:
Straight indeed is the path of the righteous legislator. Slide rule in hand, he must
avoid all thought of county lines, local traditions, politics, history, and economics,
so as to achieve the magic formula: one man, one vote.10 9
This "Draconian pronouncement" can lead to only one result: "abject




During the 89th Congress, a special House subcommittee organized to
investigate the expenditures of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, and in particular, those of its chairman, Adam Clayton Powell,
released a report charging Powell and members of his staff with decep-
tions as to certain travel expenditures and with making illegal salary pay-
ments to Powell's wife.' Formal action was postponed until the convening
of the 90th Congress; Powell was then asked to step aside when the oath
109. Supra note 67, at 550 (Harlan J., dissenting).
110. Wells I, supra note 37, at 989.
1. H.R. Rep. No. 2349, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1966).
1969] CASE NOTES
